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Owada and the whale: a Rejoinder
Nelson Coelho
The arguments provided by James Harrison as to why the ICJ conducted an inversion of
the burden of proof in the Whaling Case appear sound and conclusive; but they are also
widely speculative. As he himself underlines, even though the award of the Court implies
an interpretation of the ICRW notwithstanding clause as put forward by one of the
parties in trial – namely the applicant – it does not do it expressly and unequivocally. It is
precisely because of this lack of acknowledgeable motivation in the text of the award that
an interpreter – as any dissenting judge – can criticize the perils of “legal acrobatics” in
international justice.
For an inversion of the burden of proof not to lead to an unreasonable rebuttal of the
presumption of good faith, the reasoning underlying the decision to do so must be clear
and precise; what is more, such a decision must be founded on the merits of an explicit
legal argument and not on some implicit references to the WTO Appellate Body
interpretation of notwithstanding clauses (even less when it did not have in mind the
issues at stake in the ICRW). Failure in exposing this reasoning (or any better one) prior
to the application of the reasonability test over Japan’s program not only allows for
speculation in the legal blogosphere. Much more importantly, it also diminishes the full
normative effect any legal decision must bear upon the parties involved. Indeed, if the
Court had explained the reasoning to its interpretation of the notwithstanding clause, it
would have necessarily highlighted the due reverence towards the “obligation in another
provision” (EC – Tariff Preferences, Document WT/DS246/AB/R, 2004, §88). We are
convinced that by having done so, the Court would have given some substance to the
reasons – and the reasonability – underlying its decision to invert of the burden of proof
and hence the criticism of Judge Owada would have been unfounded.
In this award, however, the motivations for the inversion of proof provided by the
majority are too obscure for, as we submitted, §51-55 provides a very insufficient legal
justification for such an important procedural deliberation. This obscurity casts a mantle
of doubt over us interpreters – and more importantly over the applicants and the
respondent – that should not bear upon any binding legal decision, let alone in
international law where the presumption of good faith signifies reverence to national
sovereignty. Hence, what can be learned from this award is that a lot remains to be done
in international justice at the procedural level, namely in cases involving scientific
evidence. Unfortunately, the majority did not take hold of this case as an opportunity to
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contribute towards the clarification of the international legal principles of proof bearing.
This was surely something this Court could have resolved.
Nelson F. Coelho is a PhD candidate at Utrecht University.
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